


"UKRAINIZATION" OF THE BALTICS: AN EXPORT OF POLITICAL PRACTICES



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Abstract

The Baltic countries have done a lot for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. And they consider many of that to be good things. To be a mentor of a country as big as Ukraine, or a country with such rich culture as Georgia, strokes the Baltics' ego. Being the same size with Moldova, but being more successful flatters them as well.

This study presents what the Baltics have been teaching the Georgians and the Ukrainians, and what they have learned, as well as what the Ukrainians have done, that even the Baltics haven't dared.

This study uses the term “ukrainization,” which was used in the 20th century and meant the violent forcing of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture in the Ukrainian SSR. But reality has changed, and along with it, the term gained a new meaning.

The post-Maidan state of Ukrainian reality, close to classic Nazis, begs the question: have the teacher and student swapped places? And will we witness the “ukrainization” of the Baltics – exporting Ukraine’s internal policy practices into Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania?

Currently, the taboo of taking someone’s life is still in place in the Baltics, but in Ukraine – not so much anymore. And that is the main difference of the Maidan government.

The practical relevance of this study is obvious: on 11 June, Ukraine got its “bezviz.” That is how they refer the non-visa regime for holders of Ukrainian biometric foreign passports in short-term trips to EU countries. This includes the Baltic countries. Will they be able to keep the “bezviz” in check? Where will the ATO¹ participants and impoverished Ukrainians go and where will they eventually illegally settle down?

The specialists’ forecast on the impending demographic situation of the region is pessimistic: rare cities in an “anthrowasteland”. Within the Baltics themselves,

¹ ATO – Anti-terrorist operation, is what Ukraine calls the conflict in the country’s South-East.

talks of a demographic disaster are equated to state treason, but the problem will not disappear with that. Muslim country “refugees” from the European Union quota won’t solve the problem, but rather create new ones. They would rather have the ideologically similar ATO participants, who they have had mentored for a long while. Therefore, the migrants looking for new home in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia will not just be the work migrants, but also the carriers of the Bandera ideology, including ones who have actual combat experience during the punitive operations. The basis for their self-organization in the Baltics will be integral Ukrainian nationalism.

Ukraine’s denazification is a process with no clear timeframe, but it is inevitable. Obviously, everyone considered a war criminal, will attempt to escape justice.

The geographically close Baltics, loyal to Ukrainian nationalism, having established Ukrainian communities, can be for the Ukrainian ultranationalists, what Latin America was to German Nazis – a new place to set up.

The forecasted rise in Ukrainian emigration into the Baltics, due to the non-visa regime, will significantly change the situation in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, and on multiple levels. Because the Baltics’ depopulation is mostly due to unemployment (coercing emigration to Western Europe is the Baltic know-how in combatting unemployment), then this will lead to competition of jobs at the bottom of the social ladder, which due to the ethnocratic policy of the Baltic countries, are usually occupied by Russians (who make up the largest national minority in Estonia and Latvia). This competition will be quite familiar to the ATO participants, another conflict with the “moskals,”² which they have learned to solve through force. The Baltic government in turn will be happy that the Russians will start leaving again. Because the ruling elite in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are sure to fan the flames of these “labor disputes”

² A derogatory word for Russians in Ukraine.

We can also predict a sharp rise in crime. If the Ukrainian community will find leaders capable of controlling it to an acceptable degree for the Baltic government, then the issue of making Ukrainians the first (if not by numbers, then by importance) national minority, can be resolved rather quickly and radically.

Along with this, the predicted Ukrainian emigration into the Baltics will have an undoubted influence on the titular ethnicity, where the Estonians and Latvians lack their own passionarity. What kind of changes those may be, is what this study aims to examine.

Introduction

Connections with Ukraine, as well as Georgia up until recently, were an undoubted priority for the Baltic countries' foreign policy.³ USA also actively supported these connections, as part of the now-failed interstate project GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova, est. 2001). For example, when describing US President George W. Bush's visit to Estonia in December 2006, the former Estonian ambassador to USA Jüri Luik noted: "There were certain activists invited to Bush's table, who were sharing Estonia's experience in Georgia, Ukraine and other places."⁴

In a certain manner, the role of mentor to states wishing to join the European Union, seems reasonable to the Baltics, because after joining the EU in 2004, project diplomacy (which should really be called "joining diplomacy" – EU, NATO, Schengen, Euro, etc.) had lost its meaning.

The Baltic countries were forced to start looking for their role in international relations.

The European Union itself turned out to be not a "round table" where everyone is equal: in 2006, Estonian MFA councilor on EU matters Kaja Tael noted that during the EU application negotiations, it was noted that "a place and voice at the table" were important for Estonia, in three years it was obvious that "in the most important issues for Europe, we were more of a listener, than a speaker."⁵ "We can't manage to do it all, it is understandable." said Tael.

And with that said, war crimes, such as Georgia's invasion into South Ossetia, as well as Ukraine killing civilians in Donbass, have managed to get the Baltics' political support. Out of all EU countries, Estonia, had two parliamentary

³ Use of the regionism "Baltics" is obviously justified, but in the context of the study, there are certain differences between the countries that make it up.

⁴ Середенко С.Н. Внешняя политика Эстонии: без эмоций // Балтийский мир, 2001 № 2.

⁵ Same source.

declarations in support of Georgia.⁶ It was titled “On the Russian Federation’s military aggression against Georgia.”⁷

Additionally, on 10 August 2007, there was a joint statement of the Baltic countries’ parliaments.⁸ Spring 2014, the Baltic republic both gave statements “In Support of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”⁹ And it should be noted that the authors of this study agree with the Dorogomilovsky Regional Court of the city Moscow, which in December 2016 classified the events in Ukraine on Winter 2014, known as the Maidan, a state coup.¹⁰

The Baltic politicians’ unwavering determination is commendable in standing by the lies of “Russian aggression” in both the Georgian and Ukrainian variants. As an example, in June 2017, after the former speaker of the Georgian parliament Nino Burjanadze stated that “Saakashvili started the war,”¹¹ and the Russian MFA representative Maria Zakharova said that “now even the staunchest of ‘advocates’ confirm that Saakashvili started the war,” one would expect that the Baltic countries would start returning to reality.

⁶ The first statement was 23 April 2008 «In Support of Georgia’s Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity.”; the second – 12 August 2008, after Georgia attacked South Ossetia and the Russian peacekeeper base.

⁷ Riigikogu avaldus: Vene Föderatsiooni sõjalisest agressioonist georgija vastu
URL: <http://ekspress.delfi.ee/kuum/riigikogu-avalduk-gruusia-kohta?id=27680227>

⁸ Balti riikide parlamentide esimeeste avaldus
URL: <https://m.riigikogu.ee/pressiteated/balti-riikide-parlamentide-esimeeste-avalduk/>;
Главы парламентов Украины, Польши и Литвы выступили с заявлением
URL: http://news.liga.net/news/politics/1015460parlamentarii_litvy_i_polshi_vystupili_s_zayavleniem_po_ukraine.htm;
Парламент Латвии осудил "российскую военную агрессию" в Крыму
URL: <https://regnum.ru/news/polit/1775659.html>

⁹ Riigikogu avaldus Ukraina suveräänsuse ja territoriaalse terviklikkuse toetuseks
URL: <https://www.riigikogu.ee/pressiteated/riigikogu-avalduk-ukraina-suveraansuse-ja-territoriaalse-terviklikkuse-toetuseks/>

¹⁰ Российский суд признал Майдан государственным переворотом.
URL: <https://lenta.ru/news/2016/12/27/coup/>

¹¹ Бурджанадзе: Саакашвили бомбил спящий город запрещенным оружием
URL: <https://vz.ru/news/2016/6/18/816713.html>



Damaged car near the OSCE mission in Tskhinval

(photo: Yana Amelina)

But no, the “staunchest of advocates” in the face of Estonian MFA Sven Mikser stated that during US vice-president Mike Pence’s visit to Estonia in August 2017, that Russia “twice in the last decade demonstrated that it is ready to go to war on its neighbors in order to achieve its political goals. And we can’t take this lightly. On the contrary, we must treat this with the utmost importance.”¹²

¹² Миксер: Россия дважды за десять лет показала, что готова пойти войной на соседей
URL: <http://rus.postimees.ee/4197705/mikser-rossiya-dvazhdy-za-desyat-let-pokazala-chto-gotova-poyti-voynoy-na-sosedey>

Chapter I. Ukraine's Place in the Baltic Countries' Foreign Policies

The Ukrainian priority for the Baltic countries can be felt in the words of various diplomats and politicians of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, as well as official documents of their foreign policy agencies.

The Russian language version of the official Latvian MFA site has a special section "Situation in Ukraine" where they outline the history of the two countries' diplomatic relations, as well as the official Latvian stance on the Ukrainian conflict.

In the last annual report (December 2016) of the Latvian MFA on achievements and work to be done in foreign policy, official Riga continues the mentor line for Ukrainian and Georgian directions: "Latvia will continue to support the process of Georgia and Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration, providing these partner countries, political and practical aid." Overall, the 24 page document has the word Ukraine repeated 30 times.

The Ukrainian direction is an uncontested priority for Estonia, even though the Estonian leadership, hasn't developed a foreign policy concept in years, instead operating with short "priorities." However this approach has been criticized for a long time.¹³ The priorities are listed on the MFA's official site and there only one country is mentioned by name – USA – with who they want to develop a close relationship with.

Such a construct allows Estonia to operatively react to "challenges," flexibly shifting the direction of its foreign policy. For example, in January 2016, the Estonian MFA vice-councilor on policy Kyllike Sillaste-Elling said that one of the most important priorities of Estonian foreign policy is keeping the Ukrainian conflict on the world agenda.¹⁴

¹³ See for example. Tüür Karmo. Eesti välispoliitika kontseptsioon on olematu
URL: <http://parnu.postimees.ee/2105881/eesti-valispoliitika-kontseptsioon-on-olematu>

¹⁴ Eesti välispoliitika peamisi prioriteete on Ukraina konfliktide päevakorras hoidmine
URL: <http://www.ohtuleht.ee/715910/eesti-valispoliitika-peamisi-prioriteete-on-ukraina-konfliktide-paevakorras-hoidmine>

Lithuania is a lot more dynamic on the Ukrainian track than its two neighbors. Among the Baltic countries, Lithuania has the highest amount of bilateral contracts with Ukraine. In 2016, Lithuania's role was significantly increased in the European Union Advisory Mission in Ukraine, delegating three additional Lithuanian experts.

According to the Lithuanian Republic's Constitution, the prerogative of forming the foreign policy is up to the president of the country. The current president Dalia Grybauskaitė, informally affiliated with the Lithuanian conservatives from the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats party (TS-LKD), has the doctrinal basis of official Vilnius as the unspoken strategy of “containing Russia.”

The main formula of this anti-Russian doctrine can be described thusly: the more USA there is in Europe, the less Russia will be there.

In the practical sense, this manifests in the idea of creating a “buffer zone” of “democratic” states on the border with Russia, in order to separate Moscow from the rest of Europe.¹⁵ The project of a “European Ukraine” is an intrinsic part of that buffer zone.

And in Ukraine itself, they call the Baltic countries “natural allies.” Quoting the Analytical Report for the Annual Address of the Ukrainian President to the Verkhovna Rada “On the Internal and External Position of Ukraine in 2016”, prepared by the National Institute of Strategic Research: “Ukraine's natural allies are the Baltic countries, who are significantly concerned with the widespread military activity on their Eastern borders. The regular military exercises of the Russian troops and provocations on the border increase the tension in the region. Lithuania holds an especially active position in counteracting the Russian Federation's imperial ambitions and aggressive actions, which consistently protects Ukrainian interests in Brussels.”¹⁶

¹⁵ Стариков А., Носович А., Петровский П. Анатомия «европейского выбора»: НКО Польши и Прибалтики в Республике Беларусь // RuBaltic.Ru. – Калининград, 2015.
URL: <http://www.rubaltic.ru/upload/medialibrary/ffa/ffafd9c7a92fde4d14d30e2041c2e3a7.pdf>

¹⁶ Аналітична доповідь до Щорічного Послання Президента України до Верховної Ради України «Про внутрішнє та зовнішнє становище України в 2016 році». – К. : НІСД, 2016.
URL: http://www.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/files/poslanya_new-cc2e3.pdf

Chapter II. Sponsorship and Mentorship: the Contents of the Baltic Countries' "Lessons"

Having limited material resources, the Baltics countries objectively couldn't be the decisive contributors to GUAM, but the numbers show, that out of the money issued, Georgia and Ukraine were the priority: 25% of Estonia's development and humanitarian aid program fund in 2006 went to Georgia, 9% went to Ukraine and Moldova each, 6% went to Azerbaijan. The MFA Bureau Director on Cooperation in development called Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Azerbaijan "priority partner countries."¹⁷ Although the fourth GUAM member – Azerbaijan, at that moment was already de facto in the "other countries" bloc.

Latvia also "has a presence" in Ukraine and in Georgia and intends to increase that presence "as much as it can." Further Latvian support for "democratic reform" in Ukraine in 2017 got assigned additional funds of 165 864 Euro.¹⁸

The significance of the Ukrainian direction for Latvian diplomacy in particular and Baltic diplomacy as a whole, as well as the bonuses the Baltic countries get from the Ukrainian crisis can be seen in, as well as among other things, the statement of the Latvian MFA's analytical smithy – the Director of the Foreign Policy Institute of Latvia Andris Sprūds. He said, "I won't go as far to say that we must erect a monument to Mister Putin, but in some way – we should. 2014 was a bad year for Ukraine and for Crimea, but for us, the situation, as cynical as it is, was good. In 2014-2015 we finally became full-fledged NATO members. The taboo that NATO troops will never be here has been lifted. Now the NATO troops are here."¹⁹

¹⁷ Середенко С.Н. Внешняя политика Эстонии: без эмоций // Балтийский мир 2001 № 2.

¹⁸ Ārlietu ministra ikgadējais ziņojums par paveikto un iecerēto darbību valsts ārpolitikā un Eiropas Savienības jautājumos
URL: http://www.mfa.gov.lv/images/ministrija/Arpolitikas_zinojums_2016.pdf

¹⁹ Эксперт: Латвии была выгодна война на Украине
URL: <http://rus.tvnet.lv/novosti/politika/323217-ekspert-latvii-byla-vygodna-voyna-na-ukraine>

Lithuania in 2016 assigned 993 120 euro for “humanitarian aid” with 66% of them for Ukraine’s “humanitarian aids.” The priority of Lithuanian diplomacy in 2016 was declared to be the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Aside from that, representatives of the Lithuanian Parliament on Foreign Affairs and National Security and Defense declared that strengthening the EaP program must be the main priority for the European Union.²⁰ Lithuania assigned 984 900 euro to projects within Eastern Partnership in 2016 (91.2% of the project’s financing budget).



President of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaitė greeting President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich on the Eastern Partnership Vilnius Summit

(image source: rt.com)

“The Eastern Partnership is a Polish-Swedish program on strengthening integrational ties of the European Union with six countries of the former USSR.” And it didn’t become the object of desire for Lithuanian diplomacy overnight. Official Vilnius consistently filled the EaP with anti-Russian conflict-generating content. The culmination of Lithuanian policy on the Eastern direction was during the second half of 2013, during Lithuania’s presidency in the EU Council.

²⁰ Литва предложит Евросоюзу план изоляции России
URL: <https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2117870.html>

The goal and essence of this presidency was the association of Ukraine with the European Union. The preparations for the Vilnius Summit of the Eastern Partnership, where the Association Agreement was to be signed, was the very reason of Lithuania's existence during those few months.

Initially, Ukraine's association with EU, wasn't views as an anti-Russian initiative in Moscow, nor in Brussels, nor in Kiev. However, Lithuanian diplomacy did all it could for just such an antagonistic reception. The head of Lithuanian MFA Linas Linkevičius numerous times called Lithuania's part in the negotiations of Ukraine's Association with EU a "geopolitical game" against Russia. For the few months of its EU presidency, Lithuania managed to force the concept of a "geopolitical game for Ukraine's fate" in Moscow and Brussels. As political scientist Alexander Nosovich called it, the process of the West's Balticization began.²¹

The basis of Lithuanian foreign policy support of Ukraine's euro-determination, as noted before, was the messianic fetishistic idea of official Vilnius – containing Russia. The intention of not allowing the establishment and strengthening of Russia as a regional hegemon is manifested in the concept document by former Lithuanian PM, conservative Andrius Kubilius. This document, aptly titled Russian Containment Strategy was developed in 2007, while Kubilius was the PM of a right-center government, with TS-LKD party in the lead. In 2014, the Strategy had a new edition.

²¹ Носович А. Как происходит прибалтизация Запада
URL: <http://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/010416-pribaltizatsiya-zapada/>

During the last three years, Lithuania has had the following events to support Ukraine (and contain Russia):

- the European Union “On state of EU and Russia relations”²² stating that Russia and EU are no longer strategic partners. The main author of the document was Lithuanian Gabrielius Landsbergis (TS-LKD);
- torpedoing the founding act of Russia-NATO in order to increase the Alliance’s presence near the Russian borders;
- lobbying the expansion and strengthening anti-Russian sanctions;
- torpedoing Russian energy projects, including the Russia-Germany pipeline Nord Stream 2;
- lobbying for increased NATO presence in Eastern Europe;
- lobbying decisions on providing Ukraine with lethal weapons from EU and USA;
- a project by the Lithuanian Seimas of a new Marshall plan for Ukraine²³ (New European plan for Ukraine): a yearly 5 billion investments from European budgets for the development of the Ukrainian economy.

Lithuanian successes in containing Russia, in particular, Vilnius’ significant contribution to the Ukrainian conflict, which has turned into an unprecedented crisis for international relations since Soviet times and civil war within Ukraine itself, this work has certainly not evaded the watchful eye of the main beneficiary of this strategy – USA. In 2016, Barack Obama’s letter of congratulation to Dalia Grybauskaitė on the Day of the Restoration of Lithuanian Statehood, saying: “Lithuania continues to serve as a model to others, by advancing democracy and security on a global scale. Your dedication to helping other counties complete their

²² Russia is no longer a strategic partner of the EU, say MEPs
URL: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20150604IPR62878/russia-is-no-longer-a-strategicpartner-of-the-eu-say-meps>

²³ По словам экс-премьера Литвы, депутата Сейма Андриуса Кубилиуса (СО-ХДЛ), «"План Маршалла" для Украины» просто необходим, потому что экономический успех Украины – важнейший инструмент "Стратегии сдерживания России"»
URL: <https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2301844.html>

own democratic transformation has been made clear through your work in the EU Eastern Partnership.”²⁴

In Ukraine, the Baltics’ experience is seen as a successful example of European integration. Representatives of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania consult the Ukrainian ministries and agencies, hold high state positions.²⁵ The Ukrainian side gratefully notes the Baltic mentorship, singling out Lithuania. In March 2015, in Kiev “For the support of Ukraine’s independence” Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė was named “Person of the year – 2014.”²⁶

The report of the Foreign Policy Council Ukrainian Prism 2017, which was done in partnership with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Baltic countries are characterized as Ukrainian “advocates in EU and NATO.”²⁷

²⁴ President Obama hails Lithuania as «model for strengthening democracy»
URL: https://www.baltictimes.com/president_obama_hails_lithuania_as_model_to_others/

²⁵ Айварас Абромавичюс, глава Министерства экономического развития и торговли Украины (декабрь 2014 — апрель 2016); Альгирдас Шемета, бизнес-омбудсмен Украины (декабрь 2014 — настоящее время); Райвис Вецкаганс, и. о. руководителя Администрации морских портов Украины (январь 2017 — настоящее время) и т.д.

²⁶ Даля Грибаускайте получила награду «Человек года»
URL: <http://kp.ua/politics/495339-dalia-hrybauskaite-poluchyla-nahradu-chelovek-hoda>

²⁷ Українська призма: Зовнішня політика 2016. Аналітичне дослідження // ГО «Рада зовнішньої політики «Українська призма», Фонд ім. Ф. Еберта. – Київ, 2017. – 204 с.

In 2016, the European Union Advisory Mission to Ukraine was headed by the Vilnius chief of police Kęstutis Lančinskas.²⁸ As part of mission, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will teach their Ukrainian protégés the Baltic internal policy practices.



*President of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaitė, during the “Person of the Year 2014” award in Kiev
(image source: official Facebook page of Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaitė)*

Lacking in significant resources, the Baltic countries have focused on mentorship, and first and foremost on the ideology. Having a unique format of statehood, based on voluntarist theories of “occupation,” “non-recognition” and “legal continuity” (The Russian Federation doesn’t acknowledge this format),²⁹ the Baltics were objectively invested into spreading this format unto the “partner” countries, due to which, for example, Museums of Soviet Occupation appeared in Kiev in 2001 and in Tbilisi in 2006.

Mentorship went and keeps going both ways. For example, on one side, Estonian MFA, financed projects on preparing Georgian border guards, policemen,

²⁸ Užsienio reikalų ministerijos. Vystomojo bendradarbiavimo ir paramos demokratijai programos įgyvendinimo 2016 metų ataskaita

URL: [https://www.urm.lt/uploads/default/documents/Ministerija/veikla/veiklos_ataskaita/URM%202016%20m_%20veiklos%20ataskaita%20\(final\).pdf](https://www.urm.lt/uploads/default/documents/Ministerija/veikla/veiklos_ataskaita/URM%202016%20m_%20veiklos%20ataskaita%20(final).pdf)

²⁹ Середенко С.Н. Особенности прибалтийских режимов. Сборник материалов международной научно-практической конференции «Страны с проблемной демократией во главе ЕС в 2015 и 2018 гг.: угрозы глобальной безопасности». СПб, 2015.

judges, diplomats, officials, social workers and education workers. On the other side – Estonia’s top politicians, for example, the former PM and leader of the IRL party Mart Laar didn’t think twice about serving as Georgian President (2006-2008) Mikheil Saakashvili’s advisor. According to former Estonian MFA Urmas Paet, Laar’s goal was to “explain to the president and government of Georgia, what attitudes were going on in the EU and NATO right now, so Tbilisi could act as realistic as it could.”³⁰

The Baltics help to Georgia and Ukraine in their military conflicts can be divided between open and covert.

Estonian diplomat Laura Pakaste described Estonia’s help to Georgia after “Russian Aggression” in 2008 like this: “When compiling the aid packages, we looked at the official requests for aid from Georgia, which were constantly expanding as the fighting intensified. During the first days of the conflict we needed to help the wounded, so Estonia sent drugs, first aid kits, three full equipment kits for three emergency rescue teams, emergency rescue equipment to pull people from under debris, as well as blankets and thermosheets, etc.”³¹

For example, staying at the North Estonian regional hospital for ATO participants (the so-called “Anti-Terrorist Operation” on the Ukrainian East), who arrived in September 2014, Estonia was trying to hide it in various ways, presenting them as civilians.³² “We finance projects for the civilians. There is also a Defense Ministry project, which handles the military,” said the MFA at the time, Urmas Paet. Overall, in 2014, Ukraine’s needs (the ATO) received 1 million euro from Estonia. Specifically to heal 10 military men, who were mentioned before, the MFA issued 120 000 euro.

³⁰ Лаар станет консультантом Саакашвили
URL: <http://rus.delfi.ee/daily/estonia/laar-stanet-konsultantom-saakashvili?id=12854460>

³¹ Середенко С.Н. Внешняя политика Эстонии: без эмоций // Балтийский мир 2001 № 2.

³² В Эстонию на лечение придут раненые украинские военные
URL: <http://www.stena.ee/blog/v-estoniyu-na-lechenie-pribudut-ranenyie-ukrainskie-voennye>



ATO participants in the Tallinn airport were greeted with ten ambulances

(photo: Andres Putting)

Latvia and Lithuania, in turn, don't hide the fact that they provide Ukraine with military support. "In 2016, Latvia supported the development of Ukraine's defense potential, facilitating officer training in BALTDEFCOL, providing them with English lessons in Latvian educational facilities, as well as training and courses for soldiers in a series of military districts." states the Annual MFA report in Latvia on achievements and the task ahead.³³

Lithuania became the only country to openly ship³⁴ weapons to Ukraine, not even trying to hide it, all while violating³⁵ their own legal obligations in weapon exports.

³³ Ārlietu ministra ikgadējais ziņojums par paveikto un iecerēto darbību valsts ārpolitikā un Eiropas Savienības jautājumos

URL: http://www.mfa.gov.lv/images/ministrija/Arpolitikas_zinojums_2016.pdf

³⁴ Глава МИД: нота Литве - угроза всем

URL: <http://ru.delfi.lt/news/politics/glava-mid-nota-litve-ugroza-vsem.d?id=67300604>

³⁵ Комментарий Посольства России в Литве в связи с информацией о поставках боеприпасов из Литвы на Украину

URL: <https://lithuania.mid.ru/-/kommentarij-posol-stva-rossii-v-litve-v-svazi-s-informaciej-o-postavkah-boeprilasov-iz-litvy-na-ukrainu>

“We kept our promise and responded to the request by providing elements of armament... it was free help to our friendly country,” the former Defense Minister bragged³⁶ Juozas Olekas to journalists in Brussels.


According to official information, UN’s databases “Global Reported Arms Trade” in 2016, Kiev received 86 DShK machineguns (Degtyarev-Shpagin MGs, caliber 12.7 mm) and 60 KPVT (the Vladimirov construction tank mounted machineguns 14.5 mm). Also, according to Reuters,³⁷ in 2016, Lithuania provided Ukraine with 150 tons of ammunition, mainly 5.45 caliber rounds for various modifications of the Kalashnikov assault rifle.

Along with the weapons, Lithuania provided the “friendly country” other military aid. During a visit to Avdeedka, near the front in February 2017, the Lithuanian MFA Linas Linkevičius said the following: “Ukrainians spoke of a “big arrival” from Lithuania in Avdeevka.” Later Linkevičius elaborated that the big arrival: “it was either military instructors, or high level advisors, which were more than 10.”³⁸

³⁶ Литва передала Украине оружие по просьбе Киева – министр обороны/
URL: <http://interfax.com.ua/news/political/248938.html>

³⁷ Lithuania says it supplies ammunition to Ukraine for first time in two years
URL: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-lithuania-ukraine-idUSKCN1190F3>

³⁸ Украина: с Литвой нас связывают узы братства
URL: <http://dk.mfa.lt/default/ru/news/ukraina-s-litboj-nas-sbaazjybayut-uzjy-vratstba>



Lithuanian MFA Linas Linkevičius in Avdeevka

(image source: Lithuanian Republic MFA Press Department)

Information about the Estonian instructors training Ukrainian saboteurs was not published in Estonia at all.³⁹ Another fact that eludes public attention, is that the Baltic countries actually have something to share in terms of battle experience, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are warring countries. For example, in 2013, the Estonian parliament gave 7 approvals for use of Estonia's armed forces outside of the country.⁴⁰

In order to finish up the mentor topic, we should note that the Baltics do all they can to suppress activity tied to voluntary charity towards the Donbass civilians, not even mentioning the Baltic volunteers, who went to fight in the conflict on the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics side (DNR and LNR)

Also with an official Ukrainian request, the Estonian government, after following the formal procedures, handed over its own citizen to Vladimir Polyakov

³⁹ Диверсантов ВСУ готовят инструкторы НАТО, заявили в ЛНР
URL: <https://ria.ru/world/20170428/1493328869.html>

⁴⁰ Середенко С.Н. Отличительные особенности прибалтийских режимов // Сборник докладов конференции «Страны с проблемной демократией во главе ЕС в 2015 и 2018 гг.: угрозы глобальной безопасности». М. Современные тетради, 2015.

to Ukraine in 2016 for suspicions of belonging to a “terrorist organization” – the Luhansk People’s Republic.⁴¹

Another possible Luhansk volunteer, Artyom Skripnik, Latvia tried on their own, incriminating him with “illegal participation in an armed conflict” and “membership in a criminal organization.” However, in August 2017, the Vidzeme Region Court of the city of Riga acquitted Skripnik of all charges.⁴²

Latvia also put out a warrant to arrest Vycheslav Vysotsky, it is confirmed that he fought in Donbass as a volunteer and was wounded there, after which he requested political asylum in Russia. After applying a second time, he was granted such asylum.⁴³

⁴¹ Адвокат гражданина ЭР: его передача ЛНР вполне возможна, но из-за войны процессы обмена затормозились

URL: <http://yanatoom.ee/ru/адвокат-гражданина-ЭР-его-передача-ЛН/>

⁴² Суд оправдал Артема Скрипника

URL: <http://www.grani.lv/latvia/84728-sud-opravdal-artema-skripnika.html>

⁴³ Отправившийся воевать на Донбасс латвиец тяжело ранен, его могут выслать в Латвию

URL: <http://rus.delfi.ee/daily/abroad/otpravivshijsya-voevat-na-donbass-latviec-tyazhelo-ranen-ego-mogut-vyslat-v-latviyu?id=71710241>

Chapter III. The Fruits of Enlightenment: Baltic Socio-political experience in Ukraine

It is worth looking at which ideological and organizational techniques Ukraine took from the Baltics in their unchanged form and which ones it expanded and radicalized. The third chapter will examine the techniques in which Ukraine surpassed their Baltic mentors.

Ideological Concepts

Ultrationalism

Undoubtedly, first we should mention ultrationalism, or in UN terms – aggressive nationalism. And just like in the Baltics, Ukrainian ultrationalism has a “nationality” as its basis and not a “nation.” And the same understanding of a “national state” not being a *nation state*, but a copy of the Estonian *rahvusriik*, where *rahvus* means “nationality” exclusively in the ethnic sense.

The proclaimed, but so far unachieved, “development” consists of the project of a National Constitution of Ukraine,⁴⁴ developed by the nationalist Svoboda party⁴⁵: while the Estonian and Latvian constitutions simply declare Estonians and Latvians respectively as the highest state value, the Svoboda party’s vision is outright called a “National constitution.” It should be noted that currently Svoboda does not have the majority power in the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada, it does undoubtedly hold majority power over ultrationalist thought in Ukraine.

Enough is said, when the National Constitution of Ukraine project contains things, which other ultrationalists prefer not to mention; Article 2 of said document states that “The basis of creating a Ukrainian state is the

⁴⁴ The Project of the National Constitution of Ukraine
URL: <http://constitutions.ru/?p=1710>

⁴⁵ Diagnosing the Svoboda party as an Nazi party, see Eremina N., Seredenko S. Right Radicalism in Party and Political Systems in Present-day European States. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015.

national idea – the idea of sovereignty of the Ukrainian (titular) nation on Ukrainian lands.”

Occupation Theory

It has been previously mentioned that the Baltic Occupation Theory, as shown in occupation museums, has found demand in Georgia and now in Ukraine. In order to spare everyone the puzzle of who, when and how could have “occupied” Ukraine, we will quote the preamble of the aforementioned project of the National Constitution of Ukraine: “...knowing that Ukrainian nation was under the heavy, three hundred year old yoke, it survived the fearsome genocide during the years of Golodomor, which cut into the genetic pool, for hundreds of years its language and culture were being destroyed, that the Ukrainians had the spear of communist oppression aimed at them...”



A museum of “Soviet Occupation of Georgia”/ Tbilisi.

(photo by: Alexander Klimchuk / TASS)

National Tragedy – Exclusive Genocide – Golodomor.

As seen in the provided excerpt, the necessary element of Nazi ideology – national tragedy – is present in the project of the National Constitution of Ukraine as an exclusive “genocide” – the Golodomor. The Baltics have that national tragedy

as “occupation” as a state of being and “deportations” as an action. It is enough to mention that the patriarch of Ukrainian ultranationalism Lubomir Guzar called Golodomor a “nation-forming element.”⁴⁶

*“Legal continuity” and “Rewriting History”, Palingenesis.*⁴⁷

These two elements are inseparable in Ukrainian constructs. The meaning of the non-legal idea of “Legal Continuity” (not to be confused with Legal Succession) (other names are “continuity”, “legal likeness”) and it is meant to show that the current Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are the same states that existed prior to Summer 1940, when they were “occupied.” 1940-1991 are now the years of occupation when Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian statehood was in lethargic slumber. And this is the main difference of Baltic regimes from the classic Nazi: the classic Nazi ideology had the idea of rebirth (the Phoenix myth – rebirth through death), and the Baltic ideology is about a Sleeping Beauty or Snow White. And Estonian ideologist Lauri Mälksoo⁴⁸ appeals to this exact myth.

Obviously, ideological thought in Ukraine took the same track. This required even more history to be rewritten than with the Baltics. The Baltics rewriting history was a purely pragmatic act, then Ukrainians, with their emotional outbursts, don’t know when to stop – be it the invention of the “ancient Ukrs,” digging out the Black Sea, calling French Queen Anne de Russie a “Ukrainian princess” or something else.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Блаженніший Любомир Гузар (про голодомор 1932-33)
URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=btHQRFC9OAI>

⁴⁷ The term “palingenesis” was coined by Roger Griffin, taking the term from geology, where it is defined as the melting of newly broken rocks formations into magma. In context of political science, it means the rebirth of a previously existing state (The Third Reich for example). With the Baltics a having a significantly different meaning for palingenesis.

⁴⁸ Мяльксоо Л. Советская аннексия и государственный континуитет: международно-правовой статус Эстонии, Латвии и Литвы в 1940–1991 гг. и после 1991 г.
URL: <http://www.estemb.ru/estonija/istorija/aid-2019>

⁴⁹ Шамшиев А. От шумеров до Диогена: какой исторический креатив выдает Украина?
URL: <http://www.rubaltic.ru/article/kultura-i-istoriya/15062017-ot-shumerov-do-diogena-kakoy-istoricheskiy-kreativ-vydaet-ukraina/>

As a result, such Ukrainian “continuity” in the project of the National Constitution of Ukraine goes like this: “...the continuity of the modern Ukrainian state was based on the Kievan Rus, continued by the Kingdom of Galicia–Volhynia, the Cossack Hetmanate, the Ukrainian People's Republic, West Ukrainian People's Republic, Carpathian Ukraine and the Ukrainian state, reborn by the Act of 30 June 1941, that independent Ukraine was a result of over three hundred years of national liberation movements of the Ukrainian people...”

Nonrecognition Theory

On the contrary, the Nonrecognition Theory did not find its place in Ukrainian statehood due to historic circumstances. The Nonrecognition Theory, a theory that doesn't exist in diplomatic, political and legal practice, boils down to “civilized countries” never recognizing the Baltic states being a part of the USSR was used by the Baltics as an added element to the Occupation Theory and Legal Continuity. Because even during the Soviet period, Ukrainian SSR was a UN member, so there is no question of it not being recognized.

Decommunisation

Among most Eastern European countries which initiated a decommunisation process, only Poland had the intensity comparable to the Baltic states. Decommunisation, as a process is closely tied to “rewriting history”, which led to a “war on monuments” – the most telling example here is the removal of the Bronze Soldier⁵⁰ in Tallinn in April 2007. Which also saw the highest level of violence (against those defending the monument) that the Baltic states ever achieved.

⁵⁰ The common name of the Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn monument.



Leaving flowers at the monument to the Liberator-warrior, after it was relocated to the Tallinn military cemetery

(image source: RIA Novosti)

“Condemning the crimes of communism”, equating Nazism and communism is also a calling card of the Baltic politicians. Estonia started its presidency in the EU Council (1 July – 31 December 2017) with an event called Memorial Conference for the Victims of Communism and Nazism: The Heritage in 21st Century Europe of the Crimes Committed by Communist Regimes,⁵¹ which took place in Tallinn on 23 August 2017 – on the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signing. After the Greek Justice Minister Stavros Kontonis quite bluntly refused to participate in that conference, it was hastily renamed into the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Communist and Nazi Regimes conference, but the scandal was still the highlight.

Special mention goes to combating Soviet symbols. In Estonia, for example, the government have voiced their desire to ban it seven times, but never got around to doing so legislatively. In Latvia and Lithuania, the use of Soviet symbols in public places is forbidden.

⁵¹ For example, see. Носович А. Греция устроила международный скандал Эстонии
URL: <http://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/22082017-greetsiya-ustroila-mezhdunarodnyy-skandal-estonii/>

It should be noted that decommunisation, as a process, came to Ukraine quite late, but a lot more decisively. On 9 April 2015, the Verkhovna Rada, with 254 votes adopted the law “On condemning the communist and national-socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and the ban of propaganda of their symbols.” 15 May, the president signed the law, putting it in effect.

16 December 2015, the Regional Administrative Court of Kiev ruled on a case, presented by the Justice Ministry and banned the activity of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU). 25 January 2016, the High Administrative Court denied CPU the review of the case of their ban.⁵²

And in December 2015, the Venice Commission found the decommunisation law to be not up to Council of Europe standards. According to the commission, the law can lead to limitations of freedom of expression and impede parties from participating in elections.

International right organization Amnesty International in Ukraine gave the following evaluation of the CPU ban: “Banning the Communist Party of Ukraine is a dangerous precedent. This step throws Ukraine back from its path of reform and respecting human rights.”

With the decommunisation process in Ukraine, we should also note the ties of this process with the fight for “territorial integrity.” In November 2016, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) Valentyn Nalyvaichenko noted that banning the CPU is an important matter for the country’s national security, because local communist centers actively help “Russian armed forces and mercenaries in the East of Ukraine.”

⁵² Вищий адміністративний суд підтвердив законність заборони КПУ. – Мін'юст
URL: <https://minjust.gov.ua/news/ministry/vischiy-administrativniy-sud-pidtvdiv-zakonnist-zaboroni-kpu--minyust-22407>



Leninfall in Kharkiv

(image source: Luhansk online)

“War on monuments in Ukraine as part of decommunisation has taken a “Leninfall” turn, and the reports of the last monument of Lenin being demolished in numerous media.⁵³ President Petro Poroshenko himself, in October 2016, said that he is pleased with the results the wide scale decommunisation in the country. According to him, “Justice is restored for those who dedicated their lives to fight for the independence and unity of the Ukrainian state.”⁵⁴

30 May 2017, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine received a constitutional inquiry by 46 elected officials about the law “On condemning the communist and national-socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and the ban of propaganda of their symbols” actually being constitutional or not.⁵⁵

⁵³ For example, they have removed the last Lenin monument in Ukraine
URL: <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3761617-v-ukrayne-snesly-poslednyi-pamiatnyk-lenynu-smy>

⁵⁴ Порошенко гордиться масштабами декомунізації
URL: <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3754360-poroshenko-hordytsia-masshtabamy-dekommunyzatsyy>

⁵⁵ 30 травня до Конституційного Суду України надійшло конституційне подання 46 народних депутатів України
URL: <http://www.ccu.gov.ua/novyna/30-travnja-do-konstytuciynogo-sudu-ukrayiny-nadiyshlo-konstytuciyne-podannya-46-narodnyh>

Glorification of Nazis

The Baltics were the first who started rehabilitation Nazis in Europe. Because you can't have a Nazi International in principle (any self-respecting ultranationalist considers himself to be above the ultranationalist of another nationality), so there is no "common" organizational approach to such rehabilitation and never can be. For example, Estonia and Lithuanian don't have cults of the "führers" of the past (Konstantin Päts and Antanas Smetona), but that can't be said of Latvia, where the Kārlis Ulmanis cult is quite developed. With that, just like in Ukraine, along with the process of rehabilitating Nazism, they were feeding the anti-Russian hysteria and everything that would anger or hurt Russia was fair game.

One only has to recall how active the Baltics were into supporting "freedom fighters of Chechnya." Renaming one of the Riga streets into Dzhokhar Dudaev Street was one the first exercises in ideological warfare.

Faced with open resistance from the antifascists within the Baltics themselves, as well as from abroad, the process of rehabilitating Nazis in the Baltics kind of froze in indecision: there were no new initiatives, but no one is abandoning the old ones. There is still the annual "March of the SS Legionnaires" in Riga on 16 March, and in late July, the SS veterans and their young followers gather in Estonian Vaivara.

Ukraine picked up the torch around the same place where when the Baltics stopped. Alongside the Leninfall, they also started the Banderization of the country – Ukrainian Nazi collaborationists became modern Ukraine's heroes. Bandera and Shukhevych became street and avenue names, even monuments.



Torch rally in Kiev

(image source: dorzeczy.pl)

Ukraine differs from classic Nazi regimes by having a rather weak role of the state, which has led to Stormtrooper squads being formed not by the state or the party, but by the oligarchs.

But the unifying factor between the is the cult around Bandera and Shukhevych, the “heroes” of UPA-UNSO, “Glory to Ukraine – Glory to the heroes!”⁵⁶ etc.

Revolutionary

Roger Griffin defines Nazism as “revolutionary (populist) palingenesis ultranationalism.”⁵⁷ The fact that the Baltics revolutions in 1991 didn’t have a lot of blood and were later called “Singing Revolutions” doesn’t negate the fact that they were revolutions. There is no doubt that since 1991, the revolution technique and revolution strategy has developed significantly, there is now the method of the so-

⁵⁶ A salute and form of greeting, similar to “Hail Hitler”. When one says “Glory to Ukraine”, the other must reply “Glory to the heroes!”

⁵⁷ Griffin R. The nature of Fascism. Pinter. London 1991.

called Color Revolutions, so one cannot consider the Ukrainian Maidan to be direct successor of the Baltic revolutions.

The undoubted similarity with the Baltics is the significant role of nationalistic emigration, mainly for ideological purposes.

Language Policy

Jürgen Habermas said that “Language is power!” and in the Baltics they took it literally and the first attempts at gaining independence were connected with their language, or rather making the titular language a state language (the USSR didn’t have a state language at all). After stripping away people’s citizenship, Estonia and Latvia made use of the language a condition of “gaining” citizenship, with most workplaces now also demanding knowing the language. And the language policy kept getting more and more strict – almost every year, the lawmakers found (and continue to find) a field of society where the language requirements are considered “weak.” A telling example is the switch of schools with Russian language to education in Latvian (Estonian, Lithuanian). Oversight was given to the newly created agencies (State Language Center in Latvia, Language Inspection in Estonia), which are seen only as punitive by the people.

Language Policy in Ukraine was not as direct, rather it was shaky. Despite the fetishization of the Ukrainian language, Ukraine ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, after which in August 2012 they adopted the law “On the Foundations of the State Language Policy” which was well received by the expert circles.⁵⁸

However, the law ended up dividing the country, because 13 out of the 27 regions approved Russian as their regional language. Which obviously didn’t make the ultranationalists happy.

⁵⁸ Экспертное заключение «Международного института новейших государств» на закон Украины «Об основах государственной языковой политики»
URL: <http://www.iines.org/node/1071>

They have started hastily changing the legislation to the “right” way.

Organizational and legal techniques

Stealing Away Citizenship

Mass deprivation of citizenship which occurred in Estonia and Latvia in 1992, for today’s standpoint can only be viewed as a crime against humanity. Their neighbors tried talking the Lithuanian politicians from not being the odd one out, but they ultimately didn’t go through with this measure. It is mostly due to demographics – “foreigners” never made up a “decisive minority” in Lithuania, mostly due to unique national policy taken by Lithuania in Soviet times.

The practical goal of stealing away citizenship, and with it political and civil rights, was the establishment of an ethnocratic regime – a regime with the “titular nation” in power “for centuries.”

It is known that Ukraine did not go down the path, but the idea of creating noncitizens can be seen somewhat in the project of a National Constitution of Ukraine using the term “people without citizenship” quite frequently. In recent years, they have been entertaining the idea of citizenship tricks in Ukraine, starting with demands of stripping citizenship away from separatists.⁵⁹

Forced emigration

Losing citizenship, losing civil and political rights, losing social status, losing a job because you can’t speak the “state language” or “nonrecognition of diplomas” as well as lustrations have forced thousands of people in the early 90s to leave the Baltics, most of them Russian. Currently, emigration is the only state-recognized method of protest in the Baltics: don’t like it – get out of here!

⁵⁹ «Свобода» требует пожизненно лишать гражданства Украины владельцев паспортов ЛДНР
URL: <https://compromat.ws/svoboda-trebuets-pozhiznenno-lishat-grazhdanstva-ukrainy-vladel-tsev-pasportov-ldnr/>

The same is happening in Ukraine, only on a different scale. According to different sources, around 6 million citizens left the country.⁶⁰ One must also consider that the Donbass military conflict within the country also displaced around 2 million people – that number was given for former Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk.⁶¹ With the absence of a visa regime with Russian and traditional labor migration to Russia, the workload for Russian migration agencies and secret services is colossal.

Lustration

Lustration in the Baltics during the early 90s was necessary from the point of view of the “singing revolutionaries,” it focused on secret service staff and officers of the Soviet Army. In that sense, one could even call it civilized (as a revolutionary necessity, obviously), because there was a court trial in Estonia, where the court decided that the janitor of ESSR KGB was not up for lustration.

The Ukrainian experience of “garbage lustration” (Chapter IV) talks of how this term is usually used to cover up raids done for avaricious, political or simply hooligan motives.

Kaitseliit and Zemessardze – National Guard and Dobrobats

Both Estonia and Latvia have legally active paramilitary groups, Estonia has the Kaitseliit and Latvia has the Zemessardze.

⁶⁰ Сбежавший из Украины журналист: после Майдана страну покинули 6 млн. граждан
URL: <https://golospravdy.com/sbezavshij-iz-ukrainy-zhurnalist-posle-majdana-stranu-pokinuli-6-mln-grazhdan/>

⁶¹ После Майдана все заварилось в большом котле, в котором потерялся важный вопрос – кто убивал?
URL: <http://inosmi.ru/politic/20170629/239698482.html>



Exercises of the student Zemessardze battalion

(image source: stbn.lv)

From a practical standpoint, these groups were a great way to utilize the passionarity potential of the “Singing Revolutionaries.” The ideological views of these groups were obviously ultra right. In Lithuania, the “boys, who protected the Seimas building in the days of independence fighting”⁶² were turned into a special forces unit. The unit considers themselves the successors of the Forest Brothers.

Ukrainian volunteer battalions, while being non-constitutional, did not have a legal status for a long time. Their creation was the same as in the Baltics – in order to utilize the passionate charge of the masses. For example, the Azov Battalion is described thusly: “First ones to join the battalion were the volunteers from various of the Maidan Self Defense hundreds,⁶³ members of Ukraine Patriot movement and activists of the “Social-National Assembly. Initially the “black men” recorded a video message, where they said they were going to protect the East of Ukraine from

⁶² У литовских Боратов свое военное командование
URL: <http://rus.postimees.ee/1042604/u-litovskih-borатов-svoe-voennoe-komandovanie>

⁶³ A unit of a hundred members, hence the name.

separatists. The battalions numbers kept increasing until it came under Interior Ministry command.”⁶⁴

The law “On the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU) was adopted on 12 March 2014.

“Azov”, “Donbass”, “Aidar” and “Shakhtersk” and other Battalions completely or mostly consist of people, who have criminal records, nationalists and “right sectors.”⁶⁵ As well as volunteers from the Baltics, Georgia and PMC mercenaries.



Azov Batallion members taking a photo with a portrait of Hitler

(image source:: kp.ru)

They have a very strict stance on the population they are liberating. Because the new battalions don’t follow the Police rules, the “liberators” use all kinds of methods of war and punitive measures, calling back to the methods of the SS, UPA and other ultranationalist organizations of the WW2 period. Due to “specialization,”

⁶⁴ Наемнические батальоны и бандформирования Украины
URL: <http://www.fssb.su/islam-terror/islam-terror-gangs/1106-batalony-ukrainy-kto-voyuet-za-ukrainu.html>

⁶⁵ A union of Ukrainian ultra-right movements.

the NGU have the most losses out of the other units. The unique distinguishing feature of the units are the yellow ribbons.⁶⁶

The main different of the Baltic Guards from the Ukrainian ones – the latter actually participate in combat and punitive operations.

Secret Service Annual Reports – Myrotvorets site

In the “Persecution of rights activists in the Baltics,”⁶⁷ Alexander Gaponenko, Mstislav Rusakov and Sergey Seredenko noted the special role of the annual reports in persecuting dissidents. Special mention was given to the “cooperation” of the Baltic secret services with how the annual reports came out in an almost unified format. With that said, there is no doubt that these annual reports are written and published by the secret services and the liability for spreading that slander is also on the secret services. And the proof of this is in the few trials where the secret services were the defendants (in Estonia, for example, the contents of the annual report of the Estonian Kaitsepolitseiamet was contested by Centrist Party politicians Yana Toom, Mihhail Stalnuhhin and Mikhail Kylvart; in Latvia – a right activist and Elizaveta Krivtsova of the Saskaņa Party).

Probably taking this “negative” experience into account, the Ukrainian government decided not to associate themselves with such liability and launched the Myrotvorets site,⁶⁸ formally not tied to the state in any way. Myrotvorets is an open internet database, created from a Ukraine Interior Minister’s advisor Anton Gerashchenko. The site, without any court decision, publishes⁶⁹ personal data on

⁶⁶ Same source as 64

⁶⁷ Gaponenko A., Rusakov M., Seredenko S. Prosecution of the Human Rights activists in the Baltic States. Institute of European Studies. Riga-Tallinn 2016

⁶⁸ Центр исследования признаков преступлений против нацбезопасности Украины «Миротворец»
URL: <https://myrotvorets.center/>

⁶⁹ Открыт огонь на поражение
URL: <http://www.rosbalt.ru/ukraina/2015/04/16/1389556.html>

Ukrainian citizens who the site's creators label as separatists or "Agents of the Kremlin."

In the "About the Center"⁷⁰ tab, the site says the following: "The Myrotvorets Center doesn't mind the information and data on the site being used by Ukraine Defense Agency, Ukraine's Interior Ministry, Ukraine's State Border Guards, Ukrainian Armed Forces in operative and detective work."

The site periodically gets praised by the Ukraine's Interior Ministry, including its head Arsen Avakov.

The Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner Valeria Lutkovskaya sent a letter to the SBU and Interior Ministry on punishing the people who publish personal data on the Myrotvorets site and blocking the site itself, on grounds of Article 23 of the "On Protection of Personal Data" law. In response, the Interior Minister's advisor Anton Gerashchenko threatened Lutkovskaya with her resignation and declared that site's work is "tremendously important for Ukraine's national security and those who don't understand that or try to stop its work are either a puppet to someone else or working against the interests of national security," and the information is collected "exclusively from open sources – social networks, blogs, internal yellow pages, news feeds." Later the SBU published an official statement that it doesn't see any violations of Ukrainian law by the Myrotvorets site's actions.⁷¹

The Myrotvorets was registered as an online media outlet on 3 August 2016. 24 August 2017 (Ukraine's Independence day), the site launched a system of automatic facial recognition Indentigraf, in order to identify "those part of anti-Ukrainian and anti-government activity" based on photos.

⁷⁰ Центр исследования признаков преступлений против нацбезопасности Украины «Миротворец»
URL: <https://myrotvorets.center/about/>

⁷¹ Создатели сайта «Миротворец» не нарушили законодательство Украины – СБУ
URL: <http://www.unn.com.ua/ru/news/1464143-tvortsi-saytu-mirotvorets-ne-porushili-zakonodavstvo-ukrayini-sbu>

April 2015 saw the murders of former Verkhovna Rada member Oleg Kalashnikov and journalist and activist Oles Buzina. A short while before the murders, the victims' personal information was published on the Myrotvorets site, which could have been used as a lead for the killers.⁷² In both cases, the murders happened in broad daylight on the streets of Kiev, and 2.5 years later, the names of the killers are still unknown and in Buzina's case, the killer was set free.

Hate Speech

In the Baltics, the rare hate speech, usually gets documented by rights activists and condemned. The state media, with all of its tolerant views on radicals, generally will not stand for hate speech. However it is becoming popular with right and ultra-right parties (EKRE in Estonia, National Alliance in Latvia and TS-LKD in Lithuania), as well as the Ukrainian immigrants. In particular, the blog of the head of the Estonian Community in Ukraine Evhen Tsybulenko is called "Notes of an Estonian Banderovets"⁷³ and completely repeats the "nationally minded" rhetoric.

Hate speech is the norm in Ukraine.

⁷² Советник МВД Украины рекламировал сайт, на котором были адреса убитых Калашникова и Бузины
URL: <http://rus.delfi.ee/daily/abroad/sovetnik-mvd-ukrainy-reklamiroval-sajt-na-kotorom-byli-adresa-ubityh-kalashnikova-i-buziny?id=71261825>

⁷³ Записки эстонского Бандеровца
URL: http://prof-eug.livejournal.com/#post-prof_eug-695994

Persecution

Persecution in the criminal sense, as a crime against humanity, is constantly committed by the Baltic government,⁷⁴ as well as the Ukrainian one. The difference is in the scope of societal danger.

According to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ““Persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.” The Rome Statute is ratified in all three Baltic countries.

In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, “persecution” is criminalized (the criminal law provides protection), but there is no definition.

Currently Ukraine is not a party to the Rome Statute. The Ukrainian law № 1401-VIII from 02.06.2016 states that the ratification of the Rome Statute can happen no earlier than 30.06.2019.⁷⁵

In Ukraine Criminal Code’s active edition, the word persecution («переслідування» – Ukr.) is used only once: in part 2 of Art.171 of the Ukrainian Criminal code “Hindering the legal professional activity of journalists.”^{76,77}

The term “persecution” is also used in part 5 of the Minsk Agreements (February 2015).⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Подробнее см. Gaponenko A., Rusakov M., Seredenko S. Prosecution of the Human Rights activists in the Baltic States. Institute of European Studies. Riga-Tallinn 2016.

⁷⁵ Про внесення змін до Конституції України (щодо правосуддя). (Відомості Верховної Ради (ВВР), 2016, № 28, ст.532)
URL: <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1401-19>

⁷⁶ Уголовный кодекс УкраиныСтатья 171. Воспрепятствование законной профессиональной деятельности журналистов
URL: http://kodeksy.com.ua/ka/ugolovnyj_kodeks_ukraini/statja-171.htm

⁷⁷ Кримінальний кодекс України
URL: <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/2341-14>

⁷⁸ Полный текст Минских соглашений
URL: <https://ria.ru/world/20150212/1047311428.html>

In 2010 and 2014, the Verkhovna Rada had law projects that had the definition of “persecution”, however they were not adopted.^{79, 80.}

In the Baltics, only a relatively small group of people is persecuted, mostly rights activists and anti-fascists, then in Ukraine it is mostly political opponents of the ruling power – civil society, activists, journalists who criticize the ruling government.

Another separate group of persecution victims are people, tied to the military-political crisis on the country’s East.

With that, the Baltic secret services are obviously cooperating, proof of which are the cross-referencing “black lists” of people, who are banned from entering the country (Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian rights activists can’t gather in Tallinn, nor Riga, nor Vilnius, because the Latvians can’t enter Estonia or Lithuania for example), the arsenal of methods of persecution is not big.



A series of memorabilia from the Aid to the Politically Repressed in the Baltics Society. These tags are given to people, who were declared persona non grata in the Baltics or will have trouble when entering the country due to political motives

(image source: Aid to the Politically Repressed in the Baltics Society @BalticAidSociety Facebook)

⁷⁹ Проект Закону про внесення змін до деяких законодавчих актів України (щодо обмеження права Служби безпеки України та інших правоохоронних органів здійснювати політичні переслідування)
URL: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=38571

⁸⁰ Про особливий порядок місцевого самоврядування в окремих районах Донецької та Луганської області.
URL: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1680-18>

Aside from the aforementioned ban on entry into a country, “selective” searches and personal searches on the border, which could last for hours, falsifying cases of administrative violations (rarer they do that with criminal ones), unfounded detentions and searches (usually just ransacking), surveillance, wire-tapping, publishing personal data, etc. The main “disciplinary” method of the secret services was and remains the mention of someone in the annual reports, which in the Baltics is like getting black listed.

The consequences of being mentioned in the annual reports are unpredictable. For example, opposition politicians in the Tallinn city council refused to vote on giving Alexey Semyonov an award, motivating it with him being in the annual report and thus he had to be an enemy of the Estonian state.

The situation in the Baltics, when compared to Ukraine, is close to good. And concerning special organizational techniques, then we should mentioned the persecution of journalists (it exists in the Baltics, but with there being no actual alternate media, there is no one to really persecute).

Searches, detentions and arrests of journalists are done by the Interior Ministry, the Prosecutors or the SBU. From 2015 and until now, the secret services have persecuted Alexander Bondarchuk (Rabochiy Klass newspaper, on part 1, art. 110 of the Criminal Code, “attacking the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine”)⁸¹ Odessa journalists Elena Glischinskaya, Artyom Buzilka and Vitaliy Didenko (art.110 CC),⁸² Ruslan Kotsaba (p.1 art.111 CC “state treason”) and p.1 art 114-1 “hindering the legal actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and other military formations”), Dmitry Vasilets and Evgeniy Timonin (p.3 art.258 “creating a terrorist group or terrorist organization”).

⁸¹ Политзаключенный Александр Бондарчук благодаря всесторонней помощи КПУ освобожден из-под стражи в зале суда
URL: http://ru.golos.ua/suspilstvo/politzaklyuchennyiy_aleksandr_bondarchuk_blagodarya_vsestoronney_pomoschi_kpu_osvobo

⁸² Политзаключенные современной Украины: Коцаба, Головачев, Бузила и другие
URL: <http://ukraina.ru/exclusive/20170106/1018123128.html>

9 February 2015 the international rights group Amnesty International called for Ukraine to immediately free the journalist Ruslan Kotsaba, and 11 February they called him a prisoner of conscience.



Journalist Ruslan Kotsaba in court

(image source: VHIAH Agency)

Blogger Vasily Muravitsky was called “another victim of the information war” by Journalists Without Borders. The organization is calling for the Ukrainian government to free Muravitsky.⁸³ The blogger has been detained on 1 August 2017 (p.1 art.111, p.2 art.110, p.2 art.161 “violating the equality of citizens based on their race, nationality, religious beliefs, disability or other reasons” and p.1 art258-3 CC).⁸⁴

A serious pressure point is that he is kept in prison with no option of bail. Journalists are kept in pre-trial prisons for anywhere between a few months to 3 years.

⁸³ Two more victims of information war in Ukraine
URL: <https://rsf.org/en/news/two-more-victims-information-war-ukraine>

⁸⁴ На Житомирщині слідчі СБУ оголосили про підозру в державній зраді «прокремлівському» блогеру-журналісту
URL: <https://ssu.gov.ua/ua/news/1/category/2/view/3747#.Ic2BMSKQ.dpbs>

Out of legal decisions, we should mention Law 317-VIII and the President's directive № 133/2017 from 15 May on enacting the decision of the National Security and Defense Council on blocking the "Vkontakte" and "Odnoklassniki" social networks, as well as other Russian sites on Ukrainian territory.

Banning "enemy media" and social networks, fighting "Kremlin propaganda"

Fighting "Kremlin Propaganda" in the Baltics is constantly and fiercely underway and in an impressive multitude of ways. One of the most significant victories on this front is the almost complete elimination of independent newspapers in Russian language; "state-private partnership" in Baltic media allows us talk of "regime media" or "media mainstream." The decision to create versions of the central Russian TV channels adapted to the Baltics: Channel One and Channel Baltic One and so forth paid off. The cable network subscribers have no choice, which allows "News of Estonia" to be broadcast on the Russian Channel One, for example.

It should be noted that objective information from the Baltics takes a lot of effort to get to the Russian media market. There are two reasons for this: during the 2008 crisis most Russian media outlets closed their correspondent offices in the Baltics and correspondents sent to the Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania face a lot of barriers put up by the secret services, who send the journalists away on half-baked reasons right on the border inspection, usually closing their Schengen Visa along the way.

Two media projects – Baltnews and Sputnik (both projects have offices in all three Baltic countries) are under constant surveillance by the secret services.

While the Baltics have a lot of success fighting the "incorrect" point of view, they have obvious difficulties in forming the "correct" one. When the once independent media became regime ones, they have went a lot more tabloid, and without any competition, they are deteriorating quite fast. One of their main goals is hyping the militaristic fearmongering and promising a Russian attack on the Baltics in the nearest future.

Estonia decided to create a counter to the “Kremlin propaganda” – a new “good” TV channel for the Russians - ETV+, obviously under the influence of the US Congress’ decision. That decision being the Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014, section 309 that mentioned additional priorities as increasing Russian language broadcasting “in other priority countries including Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia”⁸⁵ For material support, the USA Secretary of State decided to use 7 500 000 USD annually from 2014 until 2016 for such purposes.

The results were pathetic: evaluating the experience of their neighbors, the head of the Latvian Culture Ministry’s Media Policy Department Robert Putnis said “We have Estonia’s example in front of us, where they created such a Russian-language channel ETV+, but it didn’t bring in the expected results. So we don’t really understand if there is a reason for us to try and work with the Russian-speaking viewers in the same way, through such a channel.”⁸⁶ There is no doubt to them that they need to “work with the Russian-speaking viewers”, it is just a question of selection the means for it.

⁸⁵ Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014

URL: <https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2277/text#toc ide83b0e99b9524f6697b89ae8e7fc26a0>

⁸⁶ Эстонский опыт борьбы с пропагандой Кремля в Латвии признали неудачным

URL: <http://baltnews.ee/mir/20170528/1016012448.html>

Chapter IV. Post-Maidan Ukraine's Own Political Practices

In many issues of internal political transformation, Ukraine, guided by their Baltic mentors, has managed to surpass its teacher. The post-Maidan government went further than their teachers from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

Overcoming the Prohibition of Murder

Right to life is not guaranteed in Ukraine. Murders, political, economy, mass and others are the norm in today's Ukraine. This norm is supported by the murders not getting any investigation as well. The number of murders and their geography is such that even the loudest ones can't be listed as part of just one study. Overcoming the prohibition of murder was simplified by hate speech – for example, calls to “drown the Jews in moskal blood” were taken literally. Political murders were also the norm in Saakashvili's Georgia,⁸⁷ but hate speech was not prevalent there during it.

Criminal persecution as a means of political struggle

Political persecution of politicians is always shady and always attracts suspicions, that it is motivated by political interests. Especially if the accusations happen directly before elections. This is obviously not a Ukrainian invention, but the Ukrainian scale of this is impressive. With Ukraine there are to characteristic traits. First off, law enforcement just fabricate criminal cases, instead of investigating the actual ones. Secondly, the “palette” of Criminal Code articles that these cases are started on, are all tied to “state security” in one way or another.

⁸⁷ See. Григорьев М.С. Режим Саакашвили: что это было. М. Кучково поле, 2013.

Crimes against the foundations of Ukraine's national security
(by article; recorded criminal violations in the specified period)⁸⁸

CCU articles and their meaning	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
109 Actions aimed at violent changes or an overthrow of the constitutional regime or taking state power.	6	91	48	45	42
110 Attacking the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine	0	285	217	93	89
110-2 Financing actions, aimed at violent changes or an overthrow of the constitutional regime or taking power state power, changing Ukraine's state borders	-	6	7	10	18
111 State treason	1	65	80	126	59
112 Attacking the life of a state or societal figure	1	2	5	6	3
113 Diversion	0	59	41	11	8
114 Espionage	0	7	2	2	4
114-1 Hindering the legal actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and other military formations	-	12	73	9	4
Overall	8	527	473	302	227

* Statistics for January-July 2017

Calling in for Interrogation

Interrogations are long and tiring procedures. Frequent interrogations disrupt a man's life, make him worry. During an interrogation, a witness can change into a suspect and be detained.

According to the Opposition Bloc political party's information,⁸⁹ direct state pressure (unfounded calls into the Prosecutor's Office, Interior Ministry and SBU, interrogations, searches, forced out of job or positions, administrative pressure, hindering campaigning and political activity in the regions) have been felt by more than 50 thousand people.

For example, from April till October 2015, all of the cities and regions of Zaporizhia Oblast, the Prosecutor's office interrogated participants of the peaceful event "For Ukraine's Unity" which happened in Mariinsky Park, Kiev (December 2013 – February 2014). Overall they interrogated 10 thousand people, so this method

⁸⁸ Генеральна прокуратура України
URL: <http://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/statinfo.html>

⁸⁹ Оппозиция: на Украине за два года от политических преследований пострадали 50 тыс. человек
URL: <http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/3860500>

of “working with the population” can be noted a know-how of the Ukrainian government.

As well as interrogation, searches are commonplace, which are the same as ransacking. The scale of them can be measured this way: 24 May 2017, 1700 fighters of Ukraine’s National Police and 500 military prosecutors simultaneously conducted 454 searches in 15 regions.⁹⁰ The reason for this, according to the Prosecutor-General’s office, was unmistakable evidence, that former leaders of 15 regional offices of the tax ministry followed Viktor Yanukovich and ex-minister Alexander Klimenko’s orders, organizing and supporting the illegal activity of the so called “tax evasion schemes.”

Additionally, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, The Prosecutor-General’s Office and the SBU regularly do searches in state agencies, mayor’s offices, regional councils, etc. The nominal reason is combatting corruption, however many foreign and Ukrainian experts note the selectiveness of Ukrainian justice.

Threats

A distinctive trait of Ukrainian reality are also threats in the info space, social media, regime media, state agency PR departments (SBU, The Prosecutor-General’s Office, as well as posting personal information of unwanted individuals on the Myrotvorets site. Threats in Ukraine are the norm, along with the hate speech. With it, if we view threats as a crime, then their investigation is problematic, because of hate speech being normalized – it is impossible to discern the authenticity of the spoken or published threats.

⁹⁰ Крупнейшие спецоперации против коррупции в Украине
URL: <https://ru.tsn.ua/politika/gromkie-obyski-i-zaderzhaniya-top-specoperaciy-protiv-korruptcii-v-ukraine-865353.html>

Revoking Citizenship

Revoking citizenship in Ukraine, as a political instrument is used with a degree of precision, and is usually one of the ways to persecute political opponents. This method is used on certain political figures, for example the Verkhovna Rada member Andrey Artemenko (his MP status was revoked, due to his citizenship being terminated, the act of revoking his citizenship was signed by Petro Poroshenko), MP Vadim Novinsky (so far he was only threatened with it), Mikheil Saakashvili, as well as whole groups of people.^{91, 92, 93}



In May 2015, Mikheil Saakashvili was granted Ukrainian citizenship as man who was “of state interest to Ukraine”

(image source: Корреспондент.net)

In March 2017, President Petro Poroshenko sent a (urgent) law project into the Verkhovna Rada on changing the law on Ukraine’s citizenship (№ 6175), which

⁹¹ Не только Саакашвили: За что лишали гражданства в Украине

URL: <http://nv.ua/ukraine/politics/ne-tolko-saakashvili-za-chto-lishali-grazhdanstva-v-ukraine-1564414.html>

⁹² Порошенко поручил Миграційній службі перевірити законність надання українського громадянства нардепу Новинському

URL: https://censor.net.ua/news/386363/poroshenko_poruchil_migratsionnoi_sluzhbi_proverit_zakonnost_predstavleniya_ukrainskogo_grazhdanstva

⁹³ Что стоит за лишением «диссидентов» гражданства

URL: <https://uiamp.org.ua/chto-stoit-za-lisheniem-dissidentov-grazhdanstva>

allowed him to revoke Ukrainian citizenship from anyone who voluntarily received citizenship of a different state.

“The law that presumes revoking Ukrainian citizenship in the event that a citizen gets a passport of another state would be a great tool for the President. With it, the head of state can influence Ukrainian parliamentaries. Sources say that around 80% of the MPs have dual citizenship, so they can potentially have this law used against them,”⁹⁴ said political scientist Ruslan Bortnik.

The situation with the population of Donbass takes a curious turn. Those who received LNR and DNR passports can also lose their Ukrainian citizenship.

The new law will create a new obstacle for the Minsk Agreements. The population of unrecognized republics don't hide their new DNR or LNR passports, but after losing Ukrainian citizenship they won't be able to participate in local elections, if Kiev actually decides to fulfill into the Minsk Agreements and agree to do the elections in the Donbass.

Aside from that DNR and LNR are unrecognized republics, and leaving someone without any citizenship is not allowed by the Ukrainian law in general.

Removing MP Immunity

In order to see that the removal of MP immunity (or the threat of it) became a political tool in Ukraine, we should look at the statistics.

From 1990 till 2014, 6 MPs lost their immunity. From 2014 until now – 10.

In June 2017, the Verkhovna Rada was presented with lifting immunity from 6 MPs. The most desperate measures were used only on the Opposition Bloc representative Mikhail Dobkin. It is telling that there are 40⁹⁵ criminal cases

⁹⁴ Лишить гражданства: Порошенко берет крымчан и донбассцев «на крючок»
URL: <https://easaily.com/ru/news/2017/03/16/lishit-grazhdanstva-poroshenko-beret-krymchan-i-donbasscev-na-kryuchok>

⁹⁵ САП готовит 40 уголовных дел против депутатов Рады
URL: <http://vlasti.net/news/263668>

concerning members of the Verkhovna Rada.

Attacks and “Trash Lustration”

Let us examine a few more example of the real state of affairs in Ukraine.

1 March 2014, in the Zaporizhia Oblast, a radically minded group stormed into the offices of the Tokmak city head Igor Kotelevsky, demanding that he resign.

17 March 2014, activists of the so-called “People’s Tribunal” headed by Yuri Pavlenk (Khort) threatened the members of the Vinnytsia city council from the Region Party.

From March 2014 unto March 2015, pressure from the “Right Sector”⁹⁶ and other activists continued, aiming to stop the Kherson Oblast council president Viktor Pelykh from carrying out his duties.

4 July 2016 a Member of the Severodonetsk City Council of the Lugansk Oblast, president of the regional election commission on the elections into Verkhovna Rada on the 114 district from the Opposition Bloc Evgeniy Bairamov, after multiple threats, was outright brutally beaten at his doorstep, resulting in him losing an eye. He had to leave his position as head of the election commission. Those responsible have yet to be found.

26 September 2016, a member of the Dnepropetrovsk City Council from the Opposition Block Sergey Sukhanov was attacked late night by an unknown assailant, stabbing him in the chest twice with a screwdriver. Earlier that day, on a press conference, Sergey Sukhanov presented evidence of multi-million dollar corruption of the city’s leadership. The assailant has not been found.

10 May 2017, radicals led by the member of the Chernivtsi Oblast Council from the Self Reliance political party Olga Kobevko brutally beat the president of the Chernivtsi city office of the Opposition Bloc Ruslan Tulik.

⁹⁶ A group of various Ukrainian ultranationalist organizations.

Throughout 2017, there was a string of attacks on members of the Melitopol City Council of the Zaporizhia Oblast. Dmitry Trukhin suffered knife wounds. There was an attack on the family of City Council Secretary Galina Danilchenko – with her son-in-law receiving knife wounds.

In September-October 2014, Ukraine has a wave of attacks on public officials, with the radically minded activists accusing them of corruption or connections to the previous leadership, attempting to force them to resign or stop them running for regional reelection.

The local press lightheartedly started calling this widespread lynching practice the “Trash Lustration,” because the victims of the attacks were then thrown into trash containers for humiliation purposes. The course of the attacks is usually capture on video and later published on the internet.

Representatives of the post-Maidan regime formally have nothing to do with trash lustration, although the activists, despite the heavily illegal nature of their actions, are usually never prosecuted, which shows the governments investment into such actions.

16 September 2014, activists of the Avtomaïdan near the building of the Verkhovna Rada grabbed the Region Party MP Vitaliy Zhuravsky, threw him into a trash container and sprayed him with an alcohol distillation of brilliant green paint.⁹⁷ That was they ere trying to get him to take his candidacy off the parliamentary elections. Law enforcement did nothing about this.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Otherwise known as “Zelenka,” commonly used for disinfection and sold in pharmacies. It can cause burns if applied in larger quantities and leaves a long lasting green mark, so it is favored by the activists in order to “mark” their victims as enemies.

⁹⁸ Украина Киев Депутат Виталий Журавский в мусорном баке (видео)
URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RDYh5SSntn0>



Elected MP Vitaly Zhuravsky is thrown into a trash container

(photo by Viltay Manko/Facebook)

1 October 2014, the activists threw the chief doctor of the hospital for disabled war veterans, member of the Chernivtsi Oblast Council from Region Party Manoliy Migaichuk, forcing him to sign a letter of resignation.

14 October 2014, president of the Zaporizhia State Property Fund (earlier the president of the Zaporizhia Oblast Council), Oblast Council member from the Region Party, Pavel Matvienko was attacked by radical activists. First, they threw eggs at him, then forcefully pulled him out of the building and put him into a trash container. Law enforcement looked on and did nothing.

9 March 2015, the chief of internal Policy of Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast State Administration Vasilu Kavatsyuk was thrown into a trash container, after they rode him around town in it – all for registering the regional office of the Opposition Bloc

The new state of affairs in Ukraine, the quintessence of which is shown through these attacks on dissenting opinions, trash lustrations, and mainly, overcoming the prohibition of murder, raises the question of whether the Baltics are in for “ukrainization”? Teacher and student have changed places. Now Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, ideologically and geographically similar to post-Maidan

Ukraine, risk becoming the importers of the not-so-appealing Ukrainian internal policy practices. This “ukrainization” of the Baltics will be aided by the carriers of these practices themselves, whose emigration into the Baltics will only keep growing due to continued socio-economic degradation in Ukraine and with it attaining a non-visa regime with the EU.

Conclusion

Currently Ukraine is a cancer upon Europe. “Ukrainization” – is the spread of this cancer unto neighboring ideologically similar countries. The term “ukrainization” was used in the 20th century and meant the violent forcing of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture in the Ukrainian SSR. But the reality has changed, and along with it, the term gained a new meaning. The examined foreign policy priorities of the Baltic countries, close ties of the Baltics with Ukraine, mostly ideological ones, provide grounds for a conclusion: the “ukrainization” is, above all, a threat to the Baltics themselves. And the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian governments are not just failing to see the threat of “ukrainization”, but are actively aiding it.

Currently, the taboo of taking someone’s life is still in place in the Baltics, but in Ukraine, as it was mentioned earlier – not so much anymore. And that is the main difference of the Maidan government. The new non-visa regime, so desired by the “properly minded” Ukrainians, the views on Bandera fighters as brothers in arms, makes the amount and quality of Ukrainian emigration into the Baltic highly unpredictable. And with that it, is completely obvious that the Baltics will not have any strict migration policy towards the Banderas.⁹⁹ The Baltic countries need an urgent influx of population, in the most literal sense, because the demographics of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are unsatisfactory. As Dmitry Zhitin and Anna Ivanova’s study states, “in depopulation rates, for the past 25 years, the Baltic countries surpass all of the world’s countries.”¹⁰⁰ Their forecast on the impending demographic situation of the region is pessimistic: rare cities in an “anthrowasteland”.

The EU quota on refugees from Muslim countries is another problem and not a solution. So out of all possible migration influxes, the Ukrainian one is most

⁹⁹ Otherwise know as “banderovtsy” the Common word for followers of Stepan Bandera.

¹⁰⁰ Житин Д.В., Иванова А.А., Демографическое развитие стран Балтии. Научные доклады Российской Ассоциации прибалтийских исследований. М. 2017, С. 17

attractive for the Baltics in terms of ideology and culture. Specialists assume that bulk of the people coming in from Ukraine will not be returning, and a large number will start showing themselves after 11 September, when the length of the “short-term” visit of the first arrivals will end.¹⁰¹

Along with this, the Baltics vulnerability is due to their size. Estonia barely had enough policemen to rout the defenders of the Bronze Soldier, but they won't be able to handle the organized “battalions.” Also it appears to be a surefire bet that the migration flow will have two types of migrants: the “common” work migrants (illegal ones), trying to escape poverty, unemployment corruption and the horrors of the civil conflict in the country and the second part will be the Bandera ideology carrying “ATO¹⁰² heroes.” They no longer remember how to work, but they know how to load a gun. It is obvious that the latter will protect the former and the criminal protection rackets of the 90s will quickly spring back into existence. And law enforcement's hands will be tied by political decisions. And if there almost no corruption in the lower levels of Estonia and Latvia's police forces, then the Ukrainians will import it in.

It should be noted here, that Latvian and Estonian citizenship is not a status, it is a privilege. In the early 90s, Estonian government was very strict with the level of the Russian community's protest levels, giving out citizenship to its “proper” leaders for “special achievements.” So the example is there and the question of legalizing the Bandera tops in the new Ukrainian community in Estonia may be resolved quickly. The forecast on the relations of the new community with the existing Russian community of Estonia is obvious to the Baltics – war until the bitter end. The key issue here is whether this forecast is alarmist or realistic? One could have given an answer if the Baltics' policies were independent. So the authors, basing their views on the undertaken study, find this forecast highly probably, if all

¹⁰¹ Бомба украинского «безвиза» рванёт 11 сентября.
URL: <http://www.politnavigator.net/bomba-ukrainskogo-bezviza-rvanjot-11-sentyabrya.html>

¹⁰² ATO – Anti-terrorist operation, is what Ukraine calls the conflict in the country's South-East.

of the decisions will be taken by the Baltics governments on their own first, and Ukraine on its own, secondly.